# Anonymous voting

Anonymous voting1 is a type of voting process where users can vote without revealing their identity, by proving they are accepted as valid voters.

The proof enables user privacy and allows for fully anonymous voting.

The starting point is a Merkle proof2, which efficiently proves that a voter's key belongs to a Merkle tree. However, using this proof alone would allow the organizer of a process to correlate each vote envelope with its voter's key on the database, so votes wouldn't be secret.

## Vote proof

constant "Vote" {
EcFixedPointShort VALUE_COMMIT_VALUE,
EcFixedPoint VALUE_COMMIT_RANDOM,
EcFixedPointBase NULLIFIER_K,
}

contract "Vote" {
Base process_id_0,
Base process_id_1,
Base secret_key,
Base vote,
Scalar vote_blind,
Uint32 leaf_pos,
MerklePath path,
}

circuit "Vote" {
# Nullifier hash
process_id = poseidon_hash(process_id_0, process_id_1);
nullifier = poseidon_hash(secret_key, process_id);
constrain_instance(nullifier);

# Public key derivation and hashing
public_key = ec_mul_base(secret_key, NULLIFIER_K);
public_x = ec_get_x(public_key);
public_y = ec_get_y(public_key);
pk_hash = poseidon_hash(public_x, public_y);

# Merkle root
root = merkle_root(leaf_pos, path, pk_hash);
constrain_instance(root);

# Pedersen commitment for vote
vcv = ec_mul_short(vote, VALUE_COMMIT_VALUE);
vcr = ec_mul(vote_blind, VALUE_COMMIT_RANDOM);
# Since vote_commit is a curve point, we fetch its coordinates
# and constrain_them:
vote_commit_x = ec_get_x(vote_commit);
vote_commit_y = ec_get_y(vote_commit);
constrain_instance(vote_commit_x);
constrain_instance(vote_commit_y);
}


Our proof consists of four main operation. First we are hashing the nullifier using our secret key and the hashed process ID. Next, we derive our public key and hash it. Following, we take this hash and create a Merkle proof that it is indeed contained in the given Merkle tree. And finally, we create a Pedersen commitment3 for the vote choice itself.

Our vector of public inputs can look like this:

let public_inputs = vec![
nullifier,
merkle_root,
*vote_coords.x(),
*vote_coords.y(),
]


And then the Verifier uses these public inputs to verify the given zero-knowledge proof.

1

Specification taken from vocdoni franchise proof

3

See section 3: The Commitment Scheme of Torben Pryds Pedersen's paper on Non-Interactive and Information-Theoretic Secure Verifiable Secret Sharing